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FOREWORD 
Dr. Bruno Kreisky, former Chancellor of Austria, played a key role in the establish-
ment of IIASA in Austria and continues to be one of the lnstitute's strongest supporters. 
In recognition of Dr. Kreisky's continuous and dedicated support to the ideals of the 
Institute, the IIASA Council have established a new series of distinguished lectures, the 
Dr. Bruno Kreisky Lecture Series. 
IIASA was honored to have Dr. Kreisky himself inaugurate this new series with a 
lecture devoted to a key issue of the Institute, "Is there a chance for a new and global 
detente?". Through this publication we have the pleasure of making this lecture available 
to a larger audience. 
Thomas H. Lee 
Director 
International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis 
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IS THERE A CHANCE FOR A NEW AND 
GLOBAL DETENTE? 
BRUNO KREISKY 
First of all, I should like to express my appreciation for your decision to establish 
the Dr. B1Uno Kreisky Lecture Series. A retired working politician from time to time also 
needs some support so as not to fall into oblivion. Even if I, for my part, do my best to 
work against this empirical fact, I am nevertheless grateful when others help me. Even 
more so when this help comes from an institution that I esteem so highly as IIASA. 
Many people know how much I appreciate anecdotes. Therefore, I would like to 
begin with an anecdote I experienced myself. An important Swedish politican who, pre· 
sumably, would have had the greatest chance to become the successor to the great Swedish 
Social Democrat Per Albin Hansson had he not died so young, h~d invited a number of 
exiled Social Democrats to speak in the church of his home town, Dalama. 
On the way there he noticed my nervousness. After all, I had never before had an 
opportunity to speak in a church. He said with sympathy: "Dear friend, of course, I 
know that you are hesitant to speak in a church, but I can only give you one piece of 
advice: don't try to speak like a priest and preach - they have the priest for that and they 
did not invite you for that. They want to listen to you, a political refugee, and you should 
speak as such." 
I always remembered this anecdote and this advice wheti I was speaking at univer-
sities in Austria or elsewhere. I have never tried to imitate those who teach at such insti· 
tutions. They did not invite me as a professor, and therefore I have always tried to appear 
as what I am and what Truman, in such complimentary words, said about me once in 
Kansas City: that I was a working politician. This permits me to steer through the Scylla 
of a politjcian and the Charybdis of a statesman. 
Since my early youth I had been interested in theoretical questions, as was appro-
priate for an Austrian Social Democrat coming from the school of Austro-Marxism. 
Austro-Marxism - if I may, just for once, instruct you - is not the insult into which 
unfortunately it was turned later, but a school of socialist theoreticians who tried to 
apply Marxist methods to dominant and urgent problems of the time. 
Let me give you some examples: The late President Karl Renner wrote his famous 
book Der Kampf der 6sterreichischen Nationen um den Staat, which deals with the 
problems of the old monarchy and was first published in 1902. Otto Bauer's book about 
the nationality problem was later extensively used by Stalin without reference to the 
author. Another example is the profound book by Rudolf Hilferding (in spite of the 
fact that he is known as a German Minister of Finance, he was originally Austrian), Das 
Finanzkapital, which is a book by a true follower of Karl Marx and Das Kapital. And 
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finally, I have to mention the book by the Viennese philosopher Professor Max Adler 
entitled Die Staatsauffassung des Marxismus. 
These were the textbooks of my youth. It had always been my dream to study the 
very topical issue of race theory, particularly when Hitler came to power and Nazism was 
trying to establish the theoretical base for his racism. The available literature on that 
topic was highly unscientific and surprisingly it is so, to a great extent, even today; al-
though slightly adapted, it has not advanced much further. 
The Austro-Marxist theoreticians were heavily influenced in their thinking by one 
man, Professor Ernst Mach, who, at that time, taught at the Technical University of 
Vienna. (Let me quote an interesting phenomenon in parentheses: Lenin dealt with this 
philosopher in his most comprehensive work. The title of the book is Materialism and 
Empirio-criticism. As is appropriate for Marxist authors, it is very difficult to understand. 
That I have read it is only due to the fact that I spent a lot of time in prison and therefore 
had time to read this very comprehensive and complicated book. Leading figures in the 
Soviet Union were deeply surprised to find that I was knowledgeable about the works of 
Lenin. They were always soqiewhat taken aback by the fact that someone who had read 
so much of Lenin had landed on an entirely "wrong" political side.) 
In my later studies of economics, which at that time was just approaching the golden 
age of econometrics, I was concerned with that particular aspect. My studies were facili-
tated by the fact that I had had good mathematics teachers when I was a student. 
Later on I discovered that even that was not sufficient, and I had to study a book 
that I believe ·was called Mathematics for Economists. It soon turned out that that was 
not enough either, because modern economics was becoming increasingly dependent on 
ever more cpmplicated mathematics. 
Once,,when I was already Foreign Minister, I met the great British Professor Harrod 
at a reception at the Austrian Embassy in London. With some hesitation I expressed my 
concern that, as economics was gradually becoming a secret science, there would be much 
that union leader~ would no longer understand, although they, in particular, urgently 
needed to have some knowledge of economics. Much to my surprise Professor Harrod 
agreed with me and admitted, somewhat contritely, that the application of ever more 
complicated mathematical formulae was like the situation of Goethe's famous "sorcerer's-
apprentice", who could no longer put the bro,om away in the corner. 
Many of my friends also came from the scientific field. One of them, the mathema-
tician Hans Motz, went to school with me and is now, I believe, still in Oxford; another 
fri_end of mine is Vi9tor Weisskopf, with whom I am particularly closely connected through 
a common approach to the most important problems of our time; another friend is Pro-
fessor von..,w;e~sacker, the brother of the present Federal President of Germany, whom I 
met throuifi' my Pugwash activities. Another person who impressed me deeply in many 
discussions was my dear friend Szillard; I also had' a close friendship with Lise Meitner 
and many others, as a result of organizing the second Pugwash Conference in Vienna in 
the name of President Scharf, the Austrian Federal President at that time. 
I was seeking these encounters, not just because I wanted to meet prominent people, 
but because, time and again, I wanted to see confirmed the importance of science for 
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politics at a time when this fact - for better or worse, as we know today - had not been 
widely recognized. I was trying to trace the interconnections between politics and the 
sciences in my theoretical political efforts. 
I do not want to burden you with a reading list on that. I would like to conclude 
the first part of my talk by saying that in my political life I have very consciously con-
sidered myself as one of the terrible simplificateurs. In my view the definition of this 
expression is simple: it is to speak and write in such a way that it is not an insult to the 
intelligence of an academic audience, and at the same time - what is extremely impor-
tant to me - that it is also comprehensible to a miner or a steelworker. 
Believe me, it is not at all an easy goal to achieve. Someone who is active in politics 
is, time and again, confronted with the question as to what degree he keeps to the truth. 
Credibility in politics actually has an axiomatic character. I have found only one formula, 
which l have repeated over and over again, almost to the point of boredom - the words 
of the famous Catholic writer Georges Bernanos: 
I am here to tell the truth ... A man tells the truth when he says what he thinks. To say 
what one thinks is to give part of one's truth, and the good Lord himself does not ask 
for more. 
I am asking you, therefore, to view my following remarks in this spirit. I will at-
tempt to explain things which seem of relevance to me and try to refrain from specula-
tion, which - believe me - is not so easy for me, because I am very much inclined to it. 
I am not a political astrologer but, of course, I think a lot about the immediate and longer-
term future. In this sense, I should like to turn to some current political issues. 
We have to bear in mind that 60% of mankind lives in Asia, a continent with the 
largest nation in the world, China, which is the second leading center of communism in 
our time; Japan, technologically the third industrial country in the world, but with regard 
to efficiency and operational capacity probably· the first and fastest rising industrial tech-
nological power in the capitalist world economy; these two jointly with the Indian sub-
continent, East and South-East Asia together present a front of industrial growth and 
concentrated resources unheard of only one generation ago. 
When I was a political refugee in Sweden during World War II, after having been in 
a Gestapo prison, I had plenty of time to study Asian problems. At that time I read an 
interesting book by Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, which was almost unknown in 
Europe. It was entitled: The Official Record, Narrative of the Expedition of an American 
Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, and published in 1856. It shows how, in the short 
period of 120 years, Japan developed from an unknown island, which closed its doors to 
foreigners, into a highly industrialized state. 
Let me tell you about another recent personal experience. I have just come back 
from an intensive trip to South-East Asia. On this trip I used one European and three 
Asian airlines, Philippine Air, Thai Air, Singapore Air. And I found out that these are 
managed excellently. As it happened, I had problems only with one very well-known 
European airline. It shows that such a highly sophisticated economic and technological 
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field as air transport can be handled excellently by the so-called developing countries. So 
I think we should get rid of the technological arrogance often demonstrated by people of 
the industrialized world. 
I would like to talk now about the purely political questions that are the most deci-
sive issues of our time. I want to make some remarks and observations on how to regain a 
state of detente. 
THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT 
I think the historical development after the Potsdam Conference at the end of the 
war could be divided into three periods. (I am not sure whether historians would accept 
this system.) 
The first period began with the cold war and ended with the policy of containment. 
The cold war started right after the end of World War II, or rather, as I have already said, 
after the Potsdam Conference. President Truman, together with Dean Acheson and George 
F. Kennan, conceived the so-called "policy of containment" as a counter-strategy. To my 
mind, this policy was extremely successful despite its defensive character. Just allow me 
to enumerate some very crucial battlefields in this cold war: the Berlin blockade; the 
exodus of Yugoslavia out of the communist bloc; the civil war in Greece; the Marshall 
Plan, which was eminently important for the regeneration of the European economy; 
and, fast but not least, the peace treaty with Japan. 
Now I have to talk about Austria in this context. The conference of the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs of the former allies finally took place in 1954 in Berlin. I had the 
honour to be present. Even though this conference turned out to be a failure, the Aus-
trian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Leopold Figl, and I were invited to have lunch with 
Molotow at the Soviet Embassy .in Berlin. There I also met Mr. Gromyko, so we have 
known each other for 30 years. 
I should remind you that Austria had been occupied by the four former allies. At 
this lunch, Minister Molotow made a suggestion concerning Austria: the Soviet Union was 
ready to accept an Austrian state treaty if we accepted a symbolic military unit until the 
signing of a peace treaty with Germany. Minister Figl and I refused this offer. 
To our great surprise, a few months later we were invited to Moscow. In the nego-
tiations that followed, results were achieved that we had not even dreamt of: we got back 
our oil fields; otherwise we would still have the Russians on our oil fields today. They 
would have gained the right to exploit our oil fields for 30 years ahead - that is to say 
until next year. ' 
' Ji'-11< 
In Moscow we signed a memorandum that Austria would,become, in a constitu-
tional framework - and I have to stress in a constitutional framework - a permanently 
neutral state, but we declared that this permanent neutrality should be adopted by' the 
Austrian parliament after the last foreign soldier had left Austrian soil. (In parentheses I 
should like to mention that, at that time, the discussion started - and it is still going on 
today - whether a similar solution could be found for the German problem, with neutral 
status, a unified Germany.) 
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During a reception I consulted Anastasius Mikojan, the second most influential 
Soviet politician at that time, about the German question. His answer was that the neu-
trality of a state was based on a mere piece of paper. A small country would never dare to 
ignore this agreement, whereas a big one regarded it just as a piece of paper and might 
change its mind. And what, he added, are we supposed to do if, for example, Germany, 
with its 70 million inhabitants, decides to regard her neutrality as no longer valid? "Should 
we go to war?" Mikojan asked. This seemed to be a very genuine answer to my question 
whether a solution similar to that adopted for Austria could also be applied to Germany. 
I should like to end my remarks on the first part of this period by saying that, in my 
opinion, the policy of detente to which I feel committed in fact came into existence with 
the signature of the Austrian State Treaty. 
It was the attempt of Krushchev - this is my personal view - not only to revise the 
Stalinist domestic policy, but the foreign policy as well. What about the Helsinki confer-
ence? Helsinki was, in my view, the confirmation of the policy of detente. 
Some months ago, I said in a speech before students of the universities of Innsbruck 
and New Orleans that it is understandable - and I say this without the slightest irony -
that the policy of detente looks different to people in Austria, in Finland, in Sweden, in 
Norway, in Denmark, and above all in Berlin. It is obvious that they feel differently about 
detente than people in California or Texas do. For the latter it may appear as a policy of 
appeasement. For us it is pure reality. Certainly, the policy of detente did not eliminate 
the demarcation line dividing the democratic states from the communist countries in 
Europe, but it made it more permeable. The bordering states on both sides do not treat 
· each other with the same attitude of enmity as they used to during the cold war. 
I have been talking about the importance of the policy of detente for the states on 
the geographic border of democratic Western Europe and also for the bordering states of 
the Eastern bloc. It was, to a certain extent, possible for them to develop their national 
identities. 
I consider the friendship between the United States and democratic Europe as an 
axiom of politics. I have to draw some essential conclusions of particular relevance today. 
First of all - and I said this a long time before the American election and also recently in 
Japan before the election - it is the American people who elect their president and they 
alone - we have neither the possibility nor the right to interfere. We have to accept the 
results of the elections. And we have to respect the two great democratic institutions in 
the United States, the Senate and the House of Representatives. But at the same time we 
have the right to present our views on the political situation today. 
Europe, for example, cannot afford any economic warfare with the Soviet Union. 
The trade percentages between Western Europe and the Soviet Union might give the im-
pression that they are of marginal size - but in reality, especially in certain sectors, as 
for example the steel industries of Germany, Austria, France, and of other countries, the 
Soviet Union is a very important trading partner. 
Secondly, Europe is not autonomous as regards its energy resources. Only very few 
European countries have access to British and Norwegian oil. As a consequence, we are 
forced to a large extent to import gas and oil from the Soviet Union. And, to me, it 
doesn't make much difference whether one depends on the oil from the Gulf region, i.e. 
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Iran or Iraq, or from the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the export of gas and oil to 
Austria, Germany, Italy, and other countries is also of vital importance for the Soviet 
Union. It means payments in currencies that enable the Soviet Union to finance her own 
imports. In this field, we cannot accept the suggestions that we should stop our imports 
of Soviet gas. I am even convinced of the contrary - there is need of overall European 
cooperation for an integrated energy supply. 
On this occasion, it seems to me very interesting to take a look at the European 
East-West relations in trade. At the height of the cold war, nobody believed that the day 
would come when economic coop'eration between the communist and the Western indus-
trialized countries would become important for world trade as a whole. 
In the period of the 1950s, when the cold war reached its climax, exports from the 
OECD area, the United States and Japan included, to the Comecon countries amounted 
to 770 million US dollars. In the time of detente, 1980 for example, exports increased to 
42.4 billion US dollars - from less than one billion in 1950 to 42.4 billion in 1980. In 
real terms, of course, this increase is lower than these figures seem to indicate. Neverthe-
less, they show that the sixties and the seventies were characterized by an impressive ex-
pansion of mutual trade and economic cooperation. 
During the first half of the 1970s, imports of the Comecon group increased by 
more than 30% annually, and exports by more than 22%. For well-known reasons, which 
I need not discuss here, this exchange of goods has recently begun to stagnate. But this is 
not completely true. In the Financial Times of November 12, 1984, I read that trade be-
tween the Western European countries and the Eastern countries had again developed 
significantly, and it is very interesting that the Eastern European countries have also been 
able to reduce their debts to a very remarkable extent. 
I merely want to draw your attention to the considerable potential of economic 
development through an intensified exchange of goods, which exists once the right polit-
ical climate has been established. 
CURRENT PROBLEMS 
Let me now make some remarks on the third period. I prefer to call it the time of 
cold pea,ce. We are in the habit of discussing the weakness and the problems of the Soviet 
Union and its allies. We use expressions such as austerity, inefficiency, failure of the plan-
ned economy, a lack of technology, and so on. It is not my task today to discuss these 
questions, but I believe that we should not ignore our own problems. They are serious 
enough. Involved in a real arms race, we are not only competing in the field of armaments, 
"""·Ii"-'.·-~ 
but also in\'eeonomics and politics. The strength of democracie·s depends, above all, on 
their own economic and social strength. 
And here democracies face some very serious problems. The first one is unemploy-
ment. The employment forecast of the OECD was published recently. I would remind 
you that a year ago the OECD report stated that we would need 20 000 Iiew jobs daily 
simply to return to the situation of 1979, when 19 million people were unemployed in 
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the OECD member countries. In this latest report, the OECD talks of an unemployment 
level of 30 million, and according to the OECD forecast this figure will increase further. 
Here we have to face one of the most serious problems of the European industrial 
states. I don't want to discuss all the problems resulting from this high unemployment 
rate. I don't want to discuss what it means for the economy, for social peace in a society, 
and for the morale of a people, including the political morale of a people. 
Let me mention another group of problems which seem to me highly important and 
which will cause a lot of difficulties. These are the problems of agriculture. A specialist in 
common market agricultural policies, a German professor, recently stated that the agricul-
tural policy within the common market had become absurd. 
Of the Common Market budget, two thirds are used to subsidize agriculture. I want 
to remind you that with all these new loans given by the Monetary Fund to the develop-
ing countries we are subsidizing consumption. This is, in my view, a very dishonest way to 
deal with them, because we have a large number of subsidies everywhere, in the US and in 
European agriculture. I remember something I heard when I couldn't, as had been wished 
by some participants, act as a co-chairman of the Cancun conference because of illness 
and was replaced by my friend Trudeau. Some people participating in this conference 
told me that President Reagan delivered a speech telling them all that they ought to accept 
our economic rules, because they were the most efficient and above all, that there should 
be no subsidies. They should not build up the economy on subsidies. But President 
Nyerere, a very clever man educated in Anglo-Saxon schools and universities, said to 
President Reagan: "You are giving very big subsidies to your agriculture." The President 
turned to one of his collaborators and he answered Nyerere with a smile, "You are quite 
right." This is a very typical situation we have to face in many international conferences. 
I have already told you that two thirds of the budget of the Common Market, which 
is an association of European industrialized states, are used to subsidize agriculture. We 
have to keep in mind that only 8% in the member countries of the Common Market work 
in agriculture. Furthermore, there are many subsidies in the national budgets of the mem-
ber countries. The Common Market was once a net importer of agricultural products, and 
it is now a net exporter of sugar, corn, and various other products. It goes without saying 
that the developing countries have lost many markets, not to mention prices. 
To mention another problem: we have not succeeded in finding an efficient means 
of cooperation between the industrialized countries, between the OECD countries, and 
the developing countries. We are forcing the developing countries to accept our economic 
and financial philosophy. Lately this has been demonstrated at the UNIDO conference in 
Vienna. We gave them a lot of advice based on our own philosophy. As a consequence, 
they have debts amounting to more than 800 billion dollars. 
The Director General of the F AO made a paradoxical revelation, namely that the 
European Economic Committee, which was actually intended to be a union of indus-
trialized states, has in recent years become the world's largest sugar exporter and the 
second largest exporter of meat. And all because of the policies of protection and subsi-
dies. The result is that the world market prices of sugar - I am still quoting the Director 
- meat and cereals have been totally ruined. The loss of foreign currency reserves, which 
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was enormous because of the outflow, on account of the simultaneously high interest 
rates, reached an intolerable level. 
Let's be quite frank about it: the industrial countries - this is my view - will have 
to write off a good deal of that money. Through their unrest and continuous conflicts, 
the thousands of millions of starving people will very soon create a situation in which 
our Western world will be in danger. According to this view, a system of economic co-
operation has to be built up in good time, and very efficient sacrifices have to be made 
by the Western industrial states. We are on the point of becoming the victims of our own 
false conceptions. 
This has led to an aggravation of the global economic crisis. A few weeks ago the 
FED had to commit itself practically to the nationalization of the Continental Illinois 
Corporation, of course in a concealed form. A long time ago Galbraith described the 
nature of that kind of nationalization. There can be little doubt that the same thing 
would have to happen with other banks which find themselves in difficulties. We will see 
it very soon. 
It is not my objective to export to the Third World a particular model of society 
and economics. I think we have to prepare the ground for satisfying the basic needs of 
the people living in these countries. To put it quite simply: if we want to make the devel-
oping countries genuine partners of the industrial states, they must first of all be given the 
infrastructure they need to enable them to develop their own resources. This also applies 
to agriculture. When I say infrastructure, I mean transport, water and energy supplies as 
well as modern telecommunication systems. 
To put it in a nutshell: the countries of the Third World are incapable on their own 
of creating the infrastructure they need in order to play their part in the international 
division of labor. They require our substantial assistance. Only when they are in possession 
of a more or less satisfactory infrastructure, will they be able to do so. And this must, of 
course, include modern vocational training systems adapted to the prevailing conditions. 
In implementing such far-reaching infrastructural measures it would naturally be impos-
sible to apply the standards currently prevailing in the field of international credits. 
When anyone mentions the problems of financing any of these proposals, I can only 
refer to the fact that between 700 and 750 billion US dollars were spent on armaments 
during 1982. Willy Brandt said recently that next year nearly 1000 billion dollars will be 
spent (he is the head of the Commission which works on these problems) and this at a 
time when both super powers already possess a multiple overkill capacity. The United 
States is carrying on its armaments program at the cost of a gigantic deficit. And the 
people of the Soviet Union have to accept long-lasting austerity. 
PROSPECTS 
Now, as far as the dispute between the two super powers is concerned, I want to 
make some purely personal and final remarks. On the establishment of the new adminis-
tration under President Reagan, it seems to me that the United States started with an 
ideological foreign policy. The verbal ideological warfare culminated in the declaration 
DR. BRUNO KREISKY LECTURE SERIES 9 
of President Reagan that the Soviet Union was the "evil empire". Now President Reagan 
has completely changed his tone. I hope he will continue to do so in the future. And so 
has the Soviet Union. It is my opinion that never before have world politics involved such 
semantic maneuvering as they do today. Nobody can find out what is really happening 
behind what is supposed to be happening. 
I personally believe that the super powers should be prepared to undertake some 
very substantial confidence-building measures before they sit down and talk about dis-
armament. 
I can see a very important example. Both super powers are interested in a stabil-
ization of the situation in the Middle East. Let's take the case of Lebanon. My personal 
view is that this question should be dealt with within the framework of the United 
Nations or within a body which belongs to them. This, and this alone, would make it 
logical for both the United States and the Soviet Union to negotiate with all the parties 
concerned - I mean the Arab countries, including the Palestinians, and Israel. But we 
have to bear in mind that the Middle East problem does, in fact, result from the unsolved 
Palestinian question. 
Here, too, I believe a lot can be done: on the Arab side there is the so-called Fez plan 
of September 1982. On the other hand, we have the Reagan plan of September l~ 1982. 
And then we have resolution 242 adopted nearly unanimously by the United Nations. 
And then eight days after the Fez plan we had Brezhnev's declaration. In order to exam-
ine where there are similarities between these proposals and where there are differences, 
I made my own inquiries and found that there are not so many divergencies between the 
two proposals that they could not bear discussion. 
Let me now mention some other issues which seem important to me. One is what I 
would like to call the European paradox: today there is no reason whatsoever to motivate 
a war between European states. I remember when I was a young man there was permanent 
discussion about the next war between Germany and France, which would lead to a new 
world war. In today's Europe, there is no cause for such a war. The Russians' talk about a 
new German revanchism lacks any motivation. In spite of the fact that there is no reason 
for a war in Europe, we have on this continent today the greatest accumulation of arms, 
highly sophisticated arms, on both sides of the demarcation line between East and West. 
This fact in itself is a threat to peace. There is a general feeling of restlessness, above 
all among the young generation, about the capability of the governments to guarantee a 
peaceful future. There is a widespread fear of nuclear war. What we have to overcome is 
the present substantial and verbal hostility. Then we have to try to overcome the mutual 
misunderstandings. As far as misunderstandings are concerned, I think it is the special 
task of the Western democracies in Europe to bridge this gap by continuing the policy of 
normalization between the democratic states and the communist states in Europe. 
There have been attempts which failed recently, for example, between West and 
East Germany. The idea of economically boycotting the Soviet Union is, in my view, 
totally pointless, because the intellectual potential of the Soviet Union is quite strong and 
such a boycott would have only a short-term effect. 
A proof of the strength of the Soviet intellectual potential is the fact that they had 
the Sputnik first, and that they have nearly the same sophistication in armaments as the 
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United States. Here, I think, no boycott against the Soviet Union is the right approach; 
offering cooperation would be much better. 
I believe that a nuclear "cordon sanitaire" across Europe would be useful, if it were 
established on both sides of the demarcation line, of course. It would not be more than a 
homeopathic measure, but it would be a highly important symbolic agreement. 
There is no end to the list of possible initiatives and issues. There is plenty of room 
for normalization and understanding, but there is no doubt that we have to be aware that 
we are living in a time of political polarization. 
Allow me at the end of my speech to quote myself. I said in my speech at the 
Helsinki conference: 
In the documents which we are about to sign, we often find references to the fact that 
we intended to cooperate in spite of the existing difference in social systems. What are 
these different systems of which we speak? 
Perhaps it would be useful for me to give a word of clarification. Hundreds of millions of 
people live in countries which are deeply attached to the concept of political democracy. 
Other hundreds of millions of people live in countries in which the political concepts of 
the communist parties have been realized, and the autonomous developments in many 
states are worthy of note. . 
There is no point in seeking to minimize or even ignore the basic differences of these 
political systems and orders of society. I therefore welcome the clarification frequently 
made to the effect that coexistence - by which we mean the form of peaceful relations 
presently possible - cannot be understood as being valid for the ideological sphere. 
I welcome this clarification because the democratic states are firmly determined to 
obtain a bigger and bigger breakthrough for the idea of democracy. We are convinced 
that democracy in itself is a creative form of government, and that, within its framework 
and while observing strictly its principles, major social reforms have taken place and will 
take place in the future. 
Even though every effort should be made to return to a policy of detente so as to 
secure peace, there should be no illusion as to how far one can proceed on this path at 
this time of polarization of policy and society. The relationship between the big powers 
will continue to alternate between mutual antagonism and rapprochement and will, at 
best, resemble what Schopenhauer, the German philosopher, describes in a fable: 
On a cold wintry day a· company of porcupines moved closer to each other seeking each 
other's warmth so as to find protection against the frost. Soon, however, they felt each 
other's spines - which made them separate again. Whenever, thus, the need for warmth 
brought them together, the other ill repeated itself. Thus they moved from one pain to 
the ot}Jer until they found a proper distance to each other which they could tolerate. 
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